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INTRODUCTION 
Eleven days after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Con-
gress passed the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization 
Act (ATSSSA).1  Title IV of the Act created the September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund of 2001 (the “Fund”), an administrative compen-
sation scheme for those victimized by the attacks.2  The Act presents 
the purpose of the Fund with great simplicity:  “It is the purpose of 
this title to provide compensation to any individual (or relatives of a 
deceased individual) who was physically injured or killed as a result of 
the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.”3  This 
Comment questions the effectiveness of the legislation in achieving its 
stated purpose, examines the source of its failure, and offers a pro-
posal to remedy the situation. 
The Fund’s failures stem from restrictive eligibility guidelines and 
unconstitutional limitations imposed on those deemed ineligible for 
the Fund.  The definition of eligible individuals in the rules promul-
gated to administer the Fund limited the pool of people eligible for 
compensation to those who died or sustained physical injury during or 
immediately following the planes crashing into the World Trade Cen-
 
 † J.D. Candidate 2005, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. 1999, North-
western University.  Thanks to Sarah Greenberger and Bill Burgess for their thoughtful 
comments; to the editorial staff of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review for their 
hard work; to Kenneth Feinberg for his thoughts on a draft; and to my family for their 
support.  All errors are my own. 
1 Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. 107-42, 115 Stat. 
230 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §40101 (Supp. I 2001)). 
2 Pub. L. No. 107-42, §§ 401-409, 115 Stat. 230, 237-41 (2001). 
3 Id. § 403, 115 Stat. 230, 237. 
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ter (“WTC” or “towers”) and the towers collapsing.4  Additionally, 
driven by the broader purpose of the ATSSSA—protecting the airlines 
involved in the 9/11 attacks—5Congress capped the liability of the air-
lines at the limits of their insurance coverage.6  This cap limited the 
airlines’ liability to approximately six billion dollars, a pool from 
which all parties not eligible for the Fund must seek compensation.7  
In contrast, the legislation placed no cap on the amount eligible 
claimants could recover from the Fund.8 
In combination, the restrictive definition of eligible individuals 
and the airlines’ limited liability created a class of victims, those in-
jured by the 9/11 attacks but ineligible for the Fund, whose recov-
ery—if any—will be limited to the airlines’ insurance coverage.9  This 
class notably includes the estimated 300,000 people exposed to the 
toxic plume released into lower Manhattan after the collapse of the 
World Trade Center towers,10 as well as the rescue and recovery work-
ers who arrived at the site more than ninety-six hours after the at-
tacks.11  This Comment asserts that Congress had no authority to cap 
 
4 September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. § 104.2 (2004). 
5 See ATSSSA § 101(a), 115 Stat. 230, 230 (authorizing executive action “to com-
pensate air carriers for losses incurred by the air carriers as a result of the terrorist at-
tacks on the United States that occurred on September 11, 2001”).  The legislative his-
tory of the ATSSSA is almost exclusively devoted to discussion of the airlines.  147 
CONG. REC. S9589-604, H5884-919 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 2001). 
6 September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 § 408(a), 115 Stat. 230, 240.  
Subsequent amendments also capped the liability of aircraft manufacturers, property 
owners in the World Trade Center, airport owners, and governmental entities.  Avia-
tion and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 201(b)(2), 115 Stat. 597, 
645-46 (2001).  Throughout this Comment, any reference to maximum airline liability 
or the available six billion dollars is a reference to all money available from those par-
ties with legislatively limited liability with respect to 9/11. 
7 See Steven Brill, A Tragic Calculus, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 31, 2001/Jan. 7, 2002, at 28, 
29 (estimating six billion dollars in available insurance money). 
8 See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 § 404(b), 115 Stat. 230, 
240-41 (“There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to 
pay the administrative and support costs for the Special Master in carrying out this ti-
tle.”). 
9 See Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Future Harm in the Context of September 11, 88 VA. 
L. REV. 1831, 1856 (2002) (noting that there is “no apparent argument” for these clas-
sifications “[w]ithin the community of victims”). 
10 Thomas R. Frieden, Henry Falk & Timothy S. Carey, Remarks Announcing the 
Launch of the World Trade Center Health Registry 13 (Sept. 5, 2003) (transcript avail-
able at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/wtc/transcript-0905.pdf). 
11 See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 § 405(c)(2)(B)-(C), 115 
Stat. 230, 239 (stating that an eligible individual must have been present at the site at 
the time of the airplane crashes or “in the immediate aftermath”); 28 C.F.R. § 102.3 
  
2005] REMEMBERING THOSE STILL WITH US 1349 
the liability of the airlines with respect to those victims ineligible for 
the Fund.  It discusses the grounds on which the limited liability pro-
vision of the legislation should be held unconstitutional and proposes 
that an alternative compensation scheme to anticipate and resolve the 
claims of exposure-only injury victims should be created. 
I.  THE PROBLEM 
A.  The Purpose of the Victim Compensation Fund 
The Fund is the largest single-incident social welfare program in 
the history of the United States.12  Viewed in the light most generous 
to Congress, it was the product of a compelling desire to assist those 
most deeply and immediately impacted by the tragedy of 9/11.13  
Congress passed the ATSSSA only hours after it was drafted,14 produc-
ing minimal legislative history to indicate its intent.15  However, the 
few references to the Fund in the debate over the ATSSSA made con-
gressional intent clear: 
To ensure that the victims and families of victims who were physically in-
jured or killed on September 11th are compensated even if courts de-
termine that the airlines and any other potential corporate defendants 
are not liable for the harm; if insurance monies are exhausted; or are 
consumed by massive punitive damage awards or attorneys’ fees, the bill 
also creates a victims’ compensation fund.  These victims and their fami-
lies may, but are not required to, seek compensation from the Federal 
fund instead of through the litigation system. 
- Sen. John McCain
16
 
The heart of every American aches for those who died or have been in-
jured because of the tragic terrorist attacks in New York, Virginia, and 
 
(2004) (limiting “immediate aftermath” to within 96 hours after the crashes for rescue 
workers, and to within 12 hours after the crashes for all other claimants). 
12 See Lisa Belkin, Just Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 92 (not-
ing that the U.S. government has never made such payments to victims of attacks, 
natural disasters, or epidemics). 
13 Although the overall legislation was to protect the airlines, the Fund was un-
questionably a generous social welfare package intended to alleviate the suffering of 
those most personally harmed on 9/11. 
14 Belkin, supra note 12, at 92. 
15 The legislative history of the ATSSSA is brief and almost entirely focused on 
protecting the airlines.  147 CONG. REC. S9589-9604, H5884-5919 (daily ed. Sept. 21, 
2001).  The sparse references to the Fund are excerpted in text accompanying notes 
16-20. 
16 147 CONG. REC. S9594 (statement of Sen. McCain). 
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Pennsylvania on September 11th.  Our first priority should be ensuring 
that their needs are met and that they receive compensation. 
- Sen. Patrick Leahy
17
 
The Treasury of the United States has been opened by the Members of 
this Congress to ensure that every family will receive just recovery. 
- Rep. Jim Turner
18
 
It is paradoxical to fully support the airlines while reducing support for 
survivors who need to resume their lives. 
- Rep. Stephanie Tubbs Jones
19
 
Don’t we want to ensure that all legitimate plaintiffs receive compensa-
tion? 
- Sen. Orrin Hatch
20
 
The statements of the Special Master of the Fund, Kenneth Feinberg,21 
also point to the purpose of the Fund: 
The Fund provides an alternative to the significant risk, expense, and de-
lay inherent in civil litigation by offering victims and their families an 
opportunity to receive swift, inexpensive, and predictable resolution of 
claims.  The Fund provides an unprecedented level of federal financial as-
sistance for surviving victims and the families of deceased victims.
22
 
Despite the admirable purpose expressed by those associated with the 
Fund, the eligibility requirements of the Fund were insurmountable 
for many.  The Special Master’s definition of eligibility,23 although a 
practical response to the challenge presented to him, gave rise to the 
problem of precluded recovery for those victims not meeting his strict 
definition. 
B.  Defining Eligibility 
Title IV defines eligible claimants as those individuals who were 
present at the World Trade Center, Pentagon, or crash site at Shanks-
 
17 147 CONG. REC. S9599 (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
18 147 CONG. REC. H5906 (statement of Rep. Turner). 
19 147 CONG. REC. H5905 (statement of Rep. Jones). 
20 147 CONG. REC. S9595 (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
21 The Special Master was appointed by the Attorney General and empowered to, 
inter alia, “promulgate all procedural and substantive rules for the administration of 
[the Fund].”  September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 
§ 404(a)(2), 115 Stat. 230, 238. 
22 67 Fed. Reg. 11,233, 11,233 (Mar. 13, 2003). 
23 66 Fed. Reg. 66,274, 66,276-80 (Dec. 21, 2001). 
  
2005] REMEMBERING THOSE STILL WITH US 1351 
ville, Pennsylvania “at the time, or in the immediate aftermath, of the 
terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001; and suffered 
physical harm or death as a result of such an air crash.”24  This lan-
guage raises the question:  who suffered “physical harm” in “the im-
mediate aftermath” of 9/11? 
C.  Defining Physical Harm 
1.  Physical Harm Compensable by the Fund 
The Final Rule defines the physical harm necessary to be eligible 
for the Fund as: 
[A] physical injury to the body that was treated by a medical professional 
within 24 hours of the injury having been sustained, or within 24 hours 
of rescue, or within 72 hours of injury or rescue for those victims who 
were unable to realize immediately the extent of their injuries or for 
whom treatment by a medical professional was not available on Septem-
ber 11 . . . .
25
 
Although Title IV grants the Special Master the power to define harm 
as necessary to the adjudication of the Fund,26 the Fund’s definition of 
harm is different from the definition of physical harm developed by 
modern tort law.  Despite recognition of exposure-only injuries as a 
class of injury in recent mass toxic tort decisions,27 the Final Rule spe-
cifically excludes exposure-only injuries from eligibility.28  These are 
victims who were exposed to carcinogens and toxins released into the 
air when the WTC towers collapsed and who may not manifest symp-
toms of disease for many years.  The Special Master presented an ad-
ministrative justification for excluding exposure-only victims from the 
Fund:  victims who never manifest an injury would be overcompen-
sated if they were compensated today; victims who manifest severe in-
juries might be undercompensated if they receive an estimated com-
 
24 September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 § 405(c)(2)(A), 115 Stat. 
230, 239 (2001). 
25 September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. § 104.2(c)(1) 
(2004). 
26 September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 § 404(a), 115 Stat. 230, 
237-38. 
27 See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 853 (1999) (recognizing the 
“divergent interests of the presently injured and future claimants”); Amchem Prods., 
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997) (recognizing “the interest of the exposure-
only plaintiffs”). 
28 See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. § 104.2(a)-
(e) (2004) (establishing eligibility definitions and requirements). 
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pensation today.29  The Special Master went on to say that “[w]hile 
Congress might later consider whether an administrative program for 
latent harm caused by the September 11, 2001 terrorist-related aircraft 
crashes may be appropriate, the language of the statute that created 
this Fund does not contemplate awards for that purpose.”30  This rec-
ognition of the possibility of latent injuries is one of the few acknowl-
edgments that a congressional response may be necessary.  Without a 
congressional response, the members of this recognized class of victims 
will never recover for their injuries. 
2.  Physical Harm Compensable at Common Law 
Under the Fund legislation, any litigation relating to the events of 
the 9/11 attacks, including lawsuits for personal injuries, must be 
brought as a federal cause of action in the Southern District of New 
York and will be controlled by the law “of the State in which the crash 
occurred.”31  Professor Robert Rabin has surveyed the potential causes 
of action available to exposure-only 9/11 victims:32  emotional distress 
over prospective future physical harm (“cancerphobia”),33 medical 
monitoring,34 and present probabilistic recovery for future harm.35  
Applying New York’s case law to potential claims of exposure-only vic-
tims of 9/11,36 Rabin concluded that cancerphobia claims are unlikely 
 
29 September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001:  Interim Final Rule, 66 
Fed. Reg. 66,274, 66,276 (Dec. 21, 2001) (Statement by the Special Master). 
30 Id. 
31 September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 § 408(b)(2), 115 Stat. 230, 
241.  This Comment does not discuss the exposure-only victims from the Pentagon.  
The collapse of the towers created a massive class of victims in New York that does not 
exist in Virginia.  Should studies indicate that the damage caused to the Pentagon cre-
ated a sufficiently dangerous environment, those exposed to that environment should 
be eligible for compensation with the New York exposure-only victims. 
32 Rabin, supra note 9, at 1861-65. 
33 A cancerphobia claim is for compensation of the victim for the fear of develop-
ing cancer independent of whether cancer ever develops.  See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol 
Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1206 n.24 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing cases dealing with “can-
cerphobia” claims). 
34 A medical monitoring claim is for the ongoing payment of any medical costs 
incurred for proactive or preventative medical treatment.  DOMINICK VETRI ET AL., 
TORT LAW AND PRACTICE 381 (2d ed. 2002). 
35 A present probabilistic recovery for future harm claim is for the immediate 
compensation of a potential injury whose monetary value is determined by the prob-
ability of that injury manifesting and the probable severity of that manifested injury.  
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIAL ON TORTS 459-61 (7th ed. 2000). 
36 Rabin, supra note 9, at 1861-65. 
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to succeed.37  Medical monitoring claims, on the other hand, would be 
“fairly strong,”38 while present probabilistic recovery is an “open ques-
tion in New York.”39  Ultimately, Rabin concluded that “uncertainty is 
the byword for the exposure only claimant in both the liability and the 
health spheres.”40  Although he reached no definitive conclusion, 
Rabin’s article indicated that exposure-only victims do have common 
law rights and their injuries cannot be dismissed as collateral damage. 
While Rabin asserted that the exposure-only victims may have a 
valid legal claim, whether those claims have any hope of success is an 
entirely different question.  The Special Master has, on multiple occa-
sions, dismissed the chances of success of any lawsuits stemming from 
the events of 9/11.41  In an effort to encourage potential claimants to 
opt into the Fund, he speculatively compared the experience of liti-
gating a tort claim with the experience of filing a claim with the Fund: 
[The alternative] is the idea of litigating . . . for seven or eight or nine 
years, hopefully getting a verdict, hopefully having it sustained on ap-
peal, then paying your lawyer 40 percent of a fee, and then netting 
something at the end of the day while dragging through constantly remem-
bering the horror of September 11, this is an alternative program, an alterna-
tive.42 
The Special Master was referring to the families of people killed on 
9/11.  Unlike exposure-only victims, these parties would not face the 
burden of proving causation in court.  Among other hurdles, victims 
who manifest cancer in fifteen years caused by the toxins inhaled on 
September 11 will be required by a court to prove that their cancer 
must have been caused by the September 11 plume.  Although expo-
 
37 Id. at 1862-63. 
38 Id. at 1863-64. 
39 Id. at 1864-65.  Professor Rabin compares Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232 
(Pa. 1996) (holding, under the “two-disease rule” that claimants can sue for emotional 
distress and probabilistic recovery only for whatever disease they are suffering from at 
the time they sue) and Mauro v. Raymark Industries, 561 A.2d 257 (N.J. 1989) (holding 
that if a reasonable medical probability that the disease will develop can be established, 
present recovery for that disease will be permitted). 
40 Rabin, supra note 9, at 1865. 
41 See Robert S. Kelner & Gail S. Kelner, Victim Compensation Fund:  An Update, 
N.Y.L.J., May 28, 2002, at 3 (“Mr. Feinberg has described the Victim Compensation 
Fund on numerous occasions as ‘the only game in town.’”); Newsnight with Aaron Brown 
(CNN television broadcast, Feb. 4, 2002) (reporting on the Special Master’s statement 
that “suing the airlines is a dead end”), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com 
/TRANSCRIPTS/0202/04/asb.00.html. 
42 Newsnight with Aaron Brown, supra note 41 (emphasis added). 
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sure-only victims have a justiciable claim, the obstacles to prevailing on 
such a claim could very well be insurmountable. 
3.  Likelihood of Manifestation of Latent Injuries43 
It is possible that no serious injuries will ever manifest in those in-
dividuals exposed to the 9/11 plume.  However, reflecting on the 
dicta of courts imploring the legislature to implement an extra-
judicial solution to resolve the litigation problems arising from mass 
toxic torts,44 it would still be wise to implement a solution now and 
hope there is never reason to use it.  Although opponents will argue 
that this is a wasteful strategy, the scientific evidence indicates that 
there is a likelihood that this problem will arise. 
The earliest evaluations of the air quality following the collapse of 
the WTC towers were on September 17, 2001—six days after the toxic 
plume covered lower Manhattan.45  The delay leaves uncertain the ac-
curacy of studies determining actual levels of toxicity in the plume 
and the effects of direct exposure to the plume.46  Studies attempting 
 
43 Needless to say, the scientific community has undertaken countless studies of 
the medical and environmental effects of the 9/11 plume.  For lack of a better place to 
start, the reports and data discussed here are taken exclusively from the report of the 
New York Fire Department medical staff and studies conducted by the government 
agencies charged with monitoring the effects of 9/11 on human health.  Bear in mind 
that subsequent analyses have charged the government with being overly optimistic 
about the danger posed by the plume.  See generally SUZANNE MATTEI, SIERRA CLUB, 
POLLUTION AND DECEPTION AT GROUND ZERO:  HOW THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S 
RECKLESS DISREGARD OF 9/11 TOXIC HAZARDS POSES LONG-TERM THREATS FOR NEW 
YORK CITY AND THE NATION (2004), at http://www.sierraclub.com/groundzero/ 
report.pdf. 
44 See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (“[T]his litigation defies 
customary judicial administration and calls for national legislation.”); Amchem Prods., 
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622 (1997) (“The benefits asbestos-exposed persons 
might gain from the establishment of a grand-scale compensation scheme is a matter 
fit for legislative consideration.”). 
45 See Ctr. for Disease Control, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Occupational Expo-
sures to Air Contaminants at the World Trade Center Disaster Site—New York, September-October 
2001, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 453 (2002) (reporting that environ-
mental sampling took place between September 18 and October 4); David J. Prezant et 
al., Cough and Bronchial Responsiveness in Firefighters at the World Trade Center Site, 347 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 806 (2002) (“[M]ost samples were obtained after September 17, 
2001, when substantial settling of dust had already occurred.”). 
46 See Nat’l Ctr. for Envtl. Assessment, EPA, Exposure and Human Health Evalua-
tion of Airborne Pollution from the World Trade Center Disaster (External Review 
Draft) 122 (2002), at http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/cfm/recordisplay.cfm?deid=54667 
[hereinafter Exposure Evaluation] (“[V]ery little data are available to quantify expo-
sures which could have occurred in the hours and days following the collapse of the 
WTC towers.”); Paul D. Scanlon, World Trade Center Cough—A Lingering Legacy and a 
  
2005] REMEMBERING THOSE STILL WITH US 1355 
to report on air quality immediately following the collapse of the 
buildings are markedly pessimistic as compared to government studies 
based on the quality of air one week after the event.47  The validity of 
some of the government conclusions has been questioned, and even 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has admitted that it may 
have misled the public regarding the air quality at the WTC site.48  The 
one thing on which all the studies agree is that it is not possible to rule 
out the possibility of long-term injury to the exposure-only victims of 
9/11. 
a.  Harm to Firefighters 
Dr. David Prezant, the Chief Medical Officer for the New York 
City Fire Department, studied the post-9/11 respiratory health of New 
York City firefighters.49  Ninety percent of all firefighters complained 
of “severe respiratory-related cough and symptomatology” after expo-
sure to the site.50  Prezant noted “there was clinically significant respi-
 
Cautionary Tale, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 840, 841-42 (2002) (“Although the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention did not identify harmful levels in air samples, the 
sampling was undertaken after most airway injury had already occurred.”).  This in-
formation is presented not as an indictment of the EPA or any other agency but to re-
mind the reader that we are acting with imperfect information and have no way of 
knowing how severe the initial exposure was.  “[A] major uncertainty for the evalua-
tions presented in this report is the lack of information on exposures which could have 
occurred within that first critical week after September 11.”  Exposure Evaluation, su-
pra, at 123. 
47 See Jane Key, Ground Zero Air Was “Brutal” for Months, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 10, 
2003, at A1 (reporting on a study by Dr. Thomas Cahill finding that the immediate 
impact of the 9/11 plume was significantly more severe than later tests of air quality 
indicated). 
48 See EPA Inspector General Admits to Problems Following Sept. 11, NATION’S HEALTH, 
Nov. 1, 2003, at 7 (“The Environmental Protection Agency may have misled the public 
about air quality following the collapse of the World Trade Center towers in New York 
City in 2001, according to a report from the agency’s inspector general.”); EPA’s Fog 
over Lower Manhattan, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 15, 2003, at 32 (“[T]he EPA inspector 
general said last month that the White House Council on Environmental Quality 
pushed the agency to issue reassuring statements and delete cautionary ones about the 
air quality downtown.”); Kirk Johnson & Jennifer 8. Lee, When Breathing Is Believing:  
New Yorkers Doubt E.P.A. Credibility on Air Safety, but Truth Is Complex, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 
2003, at 40 (reporting Congressman Jerrold Nadler’s belief that “people would die be-
cause of what he saw as collusion between the E.P.A. and the White House”). 
49 See generally Prezant et al., supra note 45 (examining data from fire fighters who 
had been exposed to inhaled materials during and after the 9/11 attacks on the World 
Trade Center). 
50 CDC Telebriefing Transcript:  9-11-02 Special Issue Examines Health Effects Related 
to World Trade Center Terrorist Attacks (Sept. 9, 2002), at http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/ 
media/transcripts/t020909.htm. 
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ratory exposure” among firefighters exposed to the plume but who 
were asymptomatic of “World Trade Center cough.”51  He concluded 
that “[w]hether symptoms and hyperreactivity in firefighters who 
worked at the World Trade Center site will prove persistent, resulting 
in reactive airways dysfunction syndrome or airway remodeling, re-
quires long-term study.”52  In extrapolating his findings to the popula-
tion of workers and residents of lower Manhattan, Prezant speculated 
about two alternatives:  the negative health effects will be compara-
tively lower in the non-firefighter population because of the lower lev-
els of exposure or the negative health effects will be comparatively 
higher because of the superior respiratory health of firefighters.53  
Other studies favor the latter speculation, noting the presence of sev-
eral high-risk groups (e.g., children, smokers) among the general 
population.54 
b.  Harm to the General Population 
Two months after the attack, eighty-two percent of residents of 
lower Manhattan surveyed by the New York City Department of 
Health and Mental Hygiene (NYCDOHMH) and the Center for Dis-
ease Control (CDC) reported continued or increased nose or throat 
 
51 Prezant et al., supra note 45, at 813.  See id. at 806 (“‘World Trade Center cough’ 
was defined as a persistent cough that developed in a firefighter after exposure to the 
site and that was accompanied by respiratory symptoms severe enough to require 
medical leave for at least four weeks.”).  Eight percent of the firefighters present at the 
time the buildings collapsed developed WTC cough.  Id. at 807 fig.1.  Of those present 
at the site between September 11 and September 13, over three percent developed 
WTC cough.  Id. 
52 Id. at 814.  Other studies have similarly called for long-term observation of the 
respiratory health of exposed firefighters and have made varying predictions about the 
long-term effects of exposure.  See Ctr. for Disease Control, Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., Injuries and Illnesses Among New York City Fire Department Rescue Workers After Re-
sponding to the World Trade Center Attacks, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 5 (2002) (“[A]n estimated 500 FDNY firefighters (4% of the 11,336 
total FDNY firefighter workforce) might eventually qualify for disability retirement be-
cause of persistent respiratory conditions.”). 
53 Prezant et al., supra note 45, at 814.  Because any respiratory disease, including 
asthma, prevents firefighters from working at the scene of a fire, the respiratory health 
of the general population will be more susceptible to hazardous exposures.  Id. 
54 N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE & AGENCY FOR TOXIC 
SUBSTANCES & DISEASE REGISTRY, WORLD TRADE CTR. ENVTL. ASSESSMENT WORKING 
GROUP, FINAL REP. OF THE PUB. HEALTH INVESTIGATION TO ASSESS POTENTIAL 
EXPOSURES TO AIRBORNE AND SETTLED SURFACE DUST IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS OF 
LOWER MANHATTAN 31 (2002) [hereinafter FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT] (noting the 
populations of people who are more sensitive to exposure to dangerous material). 
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irritation, eye irritation or infection, or cough.55  Of residents of lower 
Manhattan with previously diagnosed asthma, twenty-seven percent 
identified worsening symptoms after 9/11.56  In the Final Report of the 
Public Health Investigation to Assess Potential Exposures to Airborne and Set-
tled Surface Dust in Residential Areas of Lower Manhattan, the 
NYCDOHMH and Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 
(ATSDR), a division of the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, took samples from lower Manhattan between November 4, 2001 
and December 11, 2001.57  Basing their analysis on these samples, 
taken two months after the toxic event, the study was unable to rule 
out long-term negative health consequences of continued exposure to 
the area.58  Without giving any consideration to the impact of direct 
plume inhalation, the study considered lung cancer,59 mesothelioma,60 
and silicosis61 to be potential long-term hazards to individuals exposed 
to the site. 
A study conducted by the CDC National Institute for Occupa-
tional Safety and Health (CDC NIOSH) found that twenty to thirty 
percent of surveyed workers at a high school and college near the 
WTC site reported symptoms of eye irritation, nose/throat irritation, 
cough, and shortness of breath four to six months after the attacks.62  
Reporting on the study, Dr. Bruce Bernard of the CDC NIOSH noted 
the striking “similarity between the prevalence of symptoms and the 
types of symptoms”63 at the different sites surveyed.  The study called 
for “further assessment to describe the nature and extent of illness in 
specific working groups as well as individual medical follow-up . . . to 
address workers’ occupational health needs.”64  Even the most optimis-
tic of these studies called for continued attention to the health of 
 
55 Ctr. for Disease Control, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Community Needs As-
sessment of Lower Manhattan Residents Following the World Trade Center Attacks—Manhattan, 
New York City, 2001, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 10-11 
(2002). 
56 Ctr. for Disease Control, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Self-Reported Increase in 
Asthma Severity After the September 11 Attacks on the World Trade Center—Manhattan, New 
York, 2001, 51 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 781 (2002). 
57 FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT, supra note 54, at 41. 
58 Id. at 42. 
59 Id. at 35-36, 39-40. 
60 Id. at 39-40.  Mesothelioma is a lung disease caused by exposure to asbestos par-
ticles. 
61 Id. at 34-35.  Silicosis is lung damage caused by silica deposits in the lung. 
62 CDC Telebriefing Transcript, supra note 50. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
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those exposed to the WTC site.  These studies recognized that there is 
a class of September 11 victims who have or will have medical needs 
and that not only have they not been positively addressed by Congress, 
but Congress has made it more difficult for these victims to receive the 
compensation to which they are entitled. 
II.  LIMITED LIABILITY RESULTS IN  
LIMITED RECOVERY 
Section 408 of Title IV states:  “[L]iability for all claims, whether 
for compensatory or punitive damages, arising from the terrorist-
related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001, against any air carrier 
shall not be in an amount greater than the limits of the liability cover-
age maintained by the air carrier.”65  This provision limits the amount 
available to all plaintiffs with claims arising out of September 11 to 
approximately six billion dollars, a figure dwarfed by estimates of 
eighty-five billion dollars in property damage alone.66  Accordingly, it 
is unlikely that any of the six billion dollars will be available beyond 
the initial claims for property damage.67  With this in mind, and in 
conjunction with the potential problem of exposure-only victims, it is 
reasonable to conclude that Congress has precluded individuals who 
will eventually manifest injuries caused by exposure to the 9/11 plume 
from ever recovering from the airlines.68 
Thus, the question arises:  does Congress have the authority to 
limit the recovery of these potential plaintiffs?  Statutory limitations of 
liability are permissible as economic regulations under the Commerce 
Clause when the regulation bears a “rational relationship” to a con-
 
65 September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. 107-42, § 408(a), 
115 Stat. 230, 240 (2001). 
66 Brill, supra note 7, at 29 (estimating one hundred billion dollars in claims 
against the approximately six billion dollars available under Title IV); Adam Miller, 
Seething, Grieving on WTC $$, N.Y. POST, Dec. 22, 2001, at 7 (quoting an attorney who 
predicted approximately eighty-five billion dollars in property damage claims and fif-
teen billion dollars in death claims against approximately six billion dollars in available 
insurance money). 
67 One attorney commented that the six billion dollars would “probably be 
enough to handle” the claims of the thirty-eight passengers killed on United Airlines 
Flight 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania.  Miller, supra note 66, at 7.  Although the 
survivors of those thirty-eight passengers are eligible for the Fund, this statement pro-
vides an estimate of potential jury awards. 
68 See Rabin, supra note 9, at 1858-59 (discussing the depletion of available insur-
ance funds prior to the manifestation of injuries in exposure-only victims). 
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gressional concern.69  Here, there is no rational relationship between 
exposure-only victims and the airlines’ limited liability.  Making the 
exposure-only victims bear the burden of protecting the financial in-
terests of the airlines is an unconstitutional extension of congressional 
power.  Under Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 
Inc.,70 there is an insufficient relationship between the exposure-only 
victims and the airlines’ limited liability to justify the legislation under 
the Commerce Clause. 
A.  Authority to Limit Liability 
In Duke Power, the Supreme Court held that the liability limitations 
of the Price-Anderson Act71 did not render Price-Anderson an uncon-
stitutional violation of due process or equal protection.72  The Price-
Anderson Act provides indemnification to private parties participating 
in the construction or operation of nuclear power facilities and limits 
their liability on the condition that they obtain the maximum private 
insurance available and waive most affirmative defenses.73  Should a 
nuclear disaster occur and a party’s liability exceed the limitation, sec-
tion 2210(e) provides that Congress will “take whatever action is de-
 
69 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83-84 (1978).  
If the limiting clause is determined to be constitutional as an economic regulation, it 
raises the question of whether by precluding recovery for a valid cause of action, this 
clause constitutes a taking.  The Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]here is no question 
that claims for compensation are property interests that cannot be taken for public use 
without compensation.”  In re Aircrash in Bali, Indon. on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 
1312 (9th Cir. 1982).  A resolution of this question is immaterial to the argument pre-
sented here except to fortify the notion that if Congress does not provide a solution to 
this problem, the litigation necessary to determine liability and damages will be further 
compounded by takings litigation against the government.  Extended and painful liti-
gation for 9/11 victims is precisely what Congress should work to avoid. 
70 438 U.S. at 83-84. 
71 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000). 
72 See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 84, 93-94 (holding that the Price-Anderson Act 
“passes constitutional muster” and finding no equal protection violation because the 
Act’s liability limitations were “general[ly] rational[]”). 
73 42 U.S.C. § 2210(a)-(e), (n) (2000).  Specifically, the defenses that must be 
waived are: 
(i) any issue or defense as to conduct of the claimant or fault of persons in-
demnified, (ii) any issue or defense as to charitable or governmental immu-
nity, and (iii) any issue or defense based on any statute of limitations if suit is 
instituted within three years from the date on which the claimant first knew, 
or reasonably could have known, of his injury or damage and the cause 
thereof. 
Id. § 2210(n)(1); see also Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 65 & n.5 (explaining the waiver 
provision of the Price-Anderson Act). 
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termined to be necessary (including approval of appropriate compen-
sation plans and appropriation of funds) to provide full and prompt 
compensation to the public for all public liability claims resulting 
from a disaster of such magnitude.”74  The Court put tremendous em-
phasis on this provision in its opinion.75 
The district court in Duke Power struck down the Price-Anderson 
Act on the grounds that “[t]he amount of recovery is not rationally re-
lated to the potential losses” and “[t]here is no quid pro quo” for the 
liability limitations.76  The court also found an equal protection viola-
tion because the Act “placed the cost of [nuclear power] on an arbi-
trarily chosen segment of society, those injured by nuclear catastro-
phe.”77  The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Price-Anderson 
provided for constitutional economic regulation.78  The grounds for 
reversal in Duke Power do not exist in the case of 9/11 exposure-only 
victims. 
1.  Arbitrary and Irrational 
There is a “presumption of constitutionality generally accorded 
economic regulations and [those regulations are] upheld absent 
proof of arbitrariness or irrationality on the part of Congress.”79  How-
ever, under the standards of arbitrariness and irrationality set forth in 
Duke Power, the liability limitation of Title IV of the ATSSSA is uncon-
stitutional. 
In Duke Power, the appellees challenged the amount at which li-
ability was capped on the grounds that it was an arbitrary figure.80  The 
Court upheld the limitation: 
The reasonableness of the statute’s assumed ceiling on liability was 
predicated on two corollary considerations—expert appraisals of the ex-
ceedingly small risk of a nuclear incident involving claims in excess of 
 
74 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(2). 
75 See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 65-67 (discussing the legislative history and intent 
of the limited liability provision). 
76 Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 431 F. Supp. 
203, 222-23 (W.D.N.C. 1977), rev’d sub nom. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study 
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1977). 
77 Id. at 225.  The equal protection claim was not made to the Supreme Court in 
Duke Power.  438 U.S. at 93. 
78 See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 83 (describing the limited liability provision as “a 
classic example of economic regulation” and thus presumed constitutional unless 
proven to be arbitrary or irrational). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 84. 
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$560 million, and the recognition that in the event of such an incident, 
Congress would likely enact extraordinary relief provisions to provide 
additional relief, in accord with prior practice.
81
 
Neither of these predicates exists for Title IV. 
In the case of 9/11, the relevant event has already occurred.  A 
potential event is not a concern, and the estimates of actual damage 
far exceed the six billion dollar limitation of liability.82  The “addi-
tional relief” from Congress anticipated by the Court in Duke Power is 
in fact the legislation that limited the amount recoverable by victims.  
The Court in Duke Power pointed to the legislative history of the Price-
Anderson Act, specifically a statement that “[t]he limitation of liability 
serves primarily as a device for facilitating further congressional review 
of such a situation, rather than as an ultimate bar to further relief of 
the public.”83  The Price-Anderson limitation created a starting point; 
the Title IV limitation is the end point.  Title IV is intended to consti-
tute the entirety of congressional assistance to the victims of 9/11, but 
in the case of exposure-only victims, it is an arbitrary and irrational 
bar to recovery. 
2.  Quid Pro Quo 
The Court in Duke Power declined to resolve the question of 
whether quid pro quo is required for the abrogation of the common-
law right of recovery because the Price-Anderson Act provides a suffi-
cient substitute for the right.84  The Court discussed at length the ade-
quacy of the substituted right,85 raising the question:  if the Court was 
not inclined to require quid pro quo, why did it provide such a thor-
ough analysis of the requirement?  One might infer that despite the 
 
81 Id. at 85. 
82 See supra note 66 (noting one commentator’s estimate that there are approxi-
mately one hundred billion dollars in potential Title IV claims). 
83 Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 86 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 89-883, at 7 (1965)). 
84 Id. at 87-88; see also Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 474 U.S. 892, 894-95 
(1985) (denial of certiorari) (White, J., dissenting) (“Whether due process requires a 
legislatively enacted compensation scheme to be a quid pro quo for the common-law or 
state-law remedy it replaces, and if so, how adequate it must be, thus appears to be an 
issue unresolved by this Court.”). 
85 See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 87-93 (discussing the remedy mechanism under 
the Price-Anderson Act). 
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Court’s declining to affirmatively resolve the question, this lengthy 
analysis indicates the Court’s valuation of the requirement.86 
Should the Court decide quid pro quo is mandated by the Due 
Process Clause, the ATSSSA offers no substitute to individuals with la-
tent injuries for terminating their right to recover.  The legislative his-
tory of the Price-Anderson Act relied on by the Court predicted ex-
actly the situation created by Title IV: 
It should be emphasized, moreover, that it is collecting a judgment, not 
filing a lawsuit, that counts.  Even if defenses are waived under state law, 
a defendant with theoretically “unlimited” liability may be unable to pay 
a judgment once obtained.  When the defendant’s assets are exhausted 
by earlier judgments, subsequent claimants would be left with uncollect-
able awards.  The prospect of inequitable distribution would produce a 
race to the courthouse door in contrast to the present system of assured 
orderly and equitable compensation.
87
 
In Duke Power, the Court found that the $560 million fund, sup-
plemented by Congress’ assurance that all additional damages would 
be compensated, was a “reasonable substitute” for the opportunity to 
recover damages through litigation.88  The Court also endorsed an 
amended distribution scheme under the Price-Anderson Act that took 
into account the possibility of latent injuries.89  The Court noted the 
value of an administrative fund in lieu of litigation for adjudicating 
the rights of individuals with latent injuries:  “[t]he statutory scheme 
insures the equitable distribution of benefits to all who suffer injury—
both immediate and latent.”90  The Court further observed that “un-
der the common-law route, the proverbial race to the courthouse 
would . . . determine who had ‘first crack’ at the diminishing re-
 
86 See John Vail, A Common Lawyer Looks at State Constitutions, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 977, 
988 (2001) (describing Duke Power as “suggesting strongly that the quid pro quo doctrine 
was a federal constitutional mandate”). 
87 See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 89-90 (quoting Possible Modification or Exten-
sion of the Price-Anderson Insurance and Indemnity Act of 1957:  Hearings on H.R. 
8631 Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 69 (1975) (statement 
of William A. Anders, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n)). 
88 Id. at 91. 
89 According to the Duke Power Court: 
   The claim-administration procedures under the Act provide that in the 
event of an accident with potential liability exceeding the $560 million ceil-
ing, no more than 15% of the limit can be distributed pending court ap-
proval of a plan of distribution taking into account the need to assure com-
pensation for “possible latent injury claims which may not be discovered until 
a later time.” 
Id. at 92. 
90 Id. 
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sources of the tortfeasor, and fairness could well be sacrificed in the 
process.”91  Although one hesitates to ask that the tort system be fair, it 
does not seem too much to ask that a fundamental unfairness be 
eradicated. 
Title IV caps the liability of parties liable for injuries stemming 
from 9/11 but provides no substitute to a potentially huge class of ex-
posure-only plaintiffs.  Adequate compensation to members of the 
manifested-injury class is not a sufficient justification to deprive mem-
bers of the exposure-only class of their rights.92  No matter how strong 
the justification of Congress in limiting the liability of the 9/11 par-
ties, it does not satisfy even rational basis scrutiny with respect to the 
exposure-only plaintiffs.  The limitation clause expressly violates the 
stated purpose of Title IV.93  While economic legislation is permissible 
under rational scrutiny, the courts cannot accept that a narrow group 
of people—here the exposure-only victims—bears the burden of eco-
nomically sustaining the airlines.  If Congress wishes to provide eco-
nomic support to the airlines, as it clearly does, it should do so by pro-
viding compensation to all victims who could sue the airlines, not just 
to those with the easiest cases. 
III.  A PROPOSAL 
This Comment proposes a fund designed to track and compensate 
those exposure-only victims of September 11 who manifest disease 
connected to their exposure to the 9/11 plume.  Called the Latent In-
jury Fund, this fund should be loosely based on the existing Victim 
Compensation Fund and can rely on the existing World Trade Center 
Health Registry to identify applicants. 
A.  The Registry 
The fundamental mechanism necessary to track those individuals 
potentially suffering latent injuries from exposure to the 9/11 plume 
is already in place.  On September 5, 2003, the NYCDHMH, ATSDR, 
and the CDC National Center for Environmental Health (CDC 
NCEH) announced the formation of the World Trade Center Health 
 
91 Id. 
92 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997) (recognizing “the 
interest of exposure-only plaintiffs”). 
93 See supra text accompanying note 3 (citing the Act’s legislative intent to com-
pensate any individual injured on September 11). 
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Registry (the “Registry”).94  The Registry is a “comprehensive and con-
fidential health survey of those most directly exposed to the events of 
9/11” designed to track the physical and mental health of those sur-
veyed.95  The Registry tracks: 
• People who were in a building, on the street, or on the 
subway south of Chambers Street on 9/11/01. 
• People involved in rescue, recovery, or clean up, or other 
activities at the WTC site and/or WTC Recovery Opera-
tions on Staten Island any time between 9/11/01 and 
6/30/02. 
• Students and staff in schools (pre-K through 12) or day 
care centers south of Canal Street on 9/11/01. 
• People who were living south of Canal Street on 
9/11/01.96 
In establishing its purpose, the Registry’s materials note that 
“[t]he full impact of this unprecedented event on health may not be 
known for years.  We do not know if there are any long-term health 
effects among those who lived or worked near the WTC site on 
9/11.”97  In turn, the Registry’s purpose is to “understand the possible 
health consequences related to 9/11.”98 
 
94 Press Release, New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, World 
Trade Center Health Registry Created to Track and Evaluate Any Long-Term Health 
Effects of 9/11 (Sept. 5, 2003), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/ 
public/press03/pr119-0905.html.  The Registry operates in cooperation with the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Columbia University, Fire De-
partment of New York City, John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Mount 
Sinai Medical Center, New York University, New York School System, New Jersey De-
partment of Health, and Hunter College. World Trade Center Health Registry, About 
the World Trade Center (WTC) Health Registry, at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ 
doh/html/wtc/about.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2004). 
95 WORLD TRADE CTR. HEALTH REGISTRY, N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL 
HYGIENE, HOW TO ENROLL IN THE WORLD TRADE CENTER HEALTH REGISTRY (2003) 
[hereinafter HOW TO ENROLL], available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/ 
html/wtc/Brochure.pdf. 
96 Id. 
97 Id.  In a direct appeal to the target population, the Registry expresses the same 
sentiment: 
Even if you have been healthy since 9/11, it is important for you to sign up.  
In order to have a full and accurate picture of any long-term health effects re-
lated to 9/11, both people who have been healthy and people who have been 
ill are strongly encouraged to enroll in the WTC Health Registry. 
HOW TO ENROLL, supra note 95, at 2. 
98 Id. at 1. 
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Registry organizers believe that registration of even 20,000 of the 
300,000 eligible participants would provide a sufficient base to con-
duct valuable research.99  As of September 30, 2003, only twenty-five 
days after opening registration, 12,902 people had already pre-
enrolled in the Registry and the Registry had obtained contact infor-
mation for 27,140 additional targeted individuals.100  As of September 
10, 2004, 61,087 people had been registered and interviewed by the 
Registry.101  The Registry was advertised extensively in the New York 
City subway system and PATH102 and publicized by the news media103 
indicating there will be sufficient participation to ensure accurate re-
sults.  Should these results indicate long-term health consequences to 
the exposure-only victims, there must be an assistance scheme already 
in place.  Although in the Final Report,104 the Special Master did not 
recommend prospective legislation establishing a victim compensa-
tion fund for future catastrophic events,105 these victims can be distin-
guished.  They are not potential victims.  They are identifiable indi-
viduals with the potential to manifest disease.  Both the events causing 
the harm and their resulting injuries have already occurred.  In fact, a 
small group of victims filed claims with the Fund but were rejected be-
 
99 Frieden, supra note 10, at 17-18, 23. 
100 N.Y. City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, Initial Information from the World 
Trade Center Health Registry—Data Through September 30, 2003, DATA SNAPSHOT:  
UNDERSTANDING THE HEALTH IMPACT OF 9/11, at 1 (Oct. 2003), available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/pdf/wtc/wtc-report200310.pdf. 
101 N.Y. City Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, The WTCHR Quarterly Enrollment 
Update Data Through Friday, September 10, 2004, DATA SNAPSHOT:  UNDERSTANDING THE 
HEALTH IMPACT OF 9/11, at 1, Nov. 2004, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/ 
pdf/wtc/wtc-report2004-1112.pdf. 
102 Press Release, New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, City 
Health Department Launches Subway Campaign Promoting Enrollment in the World 
Trade Center Health Registry (Oct. 8, 2003), available at http://www.nyc.gov/ 
html/doh/html/public/press03/pr136-1008.html; see also World Trade Ctr. Health 
Registry, Press Room, at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/wtc/ads.html (advertis-
ing the Registry). 
103 See Laurie Garrett, Huge Study of Health Impact; 20-Year Survey to Track Thousands, 
NEWSDAY, Sept. 6, 2003, at A2 (announcing the launch of the Registry in a Long Island 
daily newspaper); Kirk Johnson, Inquiry Opens Into Effects of 9/11 Dust, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
6, 2003, at B1 (announcing the launch of the Registry in a New York City daily newspa-
per); Rock Positano, 9-11 Registry Tracks Health, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 7, 2003, at 34 
(same); Sam Smith, Feds Launch Long-Term Studies, N.Y. POST, Aug. 10, 2003, at 17 
(same). 
104 1 KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE 
SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 (2004), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/final_report.pdf. 
105 Id., at 83-84. 
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cause they did not meet the strict eligibility requirements.106  If New 
York City and the federal government feel a need to track those ex-
posed to the 9/11 plume,107 it seems intuitive that there should be a 
solution in place if members of the observed population develop re-
lated illnesses.108 
B.  A New Fund 
Mass toxic tort litigation is a nightmare.  With the possible excep-
tion of the Agent Orange litigation,109 events leading to toxic exposure 
have never been as traumatic as the events of 9/11.  Although not a 
singular driving force, protecting 9/11 victims from being forced to 
undertake litigation was certainly an objective of the Victim Compen-
sation Fund.110  One need only glance at the litigation surrounding 
Agent Orange exposure to get a measure of the pain caused by ex-
tended litigation,111 or at asbestos litigation to see the damage and ex-
 
106 Many Sept. 11 Injury Claims Rejected, N.Y. NEWSDAY, May 1, 2004. 
107 The first two years of the Registry are funded at twenty million dollars through 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).  Frieden, supra note 10, at 16.  
Additionally, a five year study of seven thousand Ground Zero workers being con-
ducted by Mount Sinai hospital has been federally funded at ninety million dollars.  
Paul H.B. Shin, Ground Zero Workers Still Suffering, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 29, 2003, at 8. 
108 See Garrett, supra note 103, at A2 (citing a New York Environmental Law and 
Justice Project attorney describing the Registry as “too little, too late”); Maggie 
Haberman, Unions Rip WTC Health Registry, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 27, 2003, at 28 (re-
porting on unions dismissing the Registry because it does not provide any referrals for 
or increased access to health care). 
109 See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 1987).  
The court stated: 
The correspondence to the court . . . amply demonstrate[s] that this litigation 
is viewed by many as something more than an action for damages for personal 
injuries.  To some, it is a method of public protest at perceived national indif-
ference to Vietnam veterans; to others, an organizational rallying point for 
those veterans.  Thus, although the precise legal claim is one for damages for 
personal injuries, the district court accurately noted that the plaintiffs were 
also seeking ‘larger remedies and emotional compensation’ that were beyond 
its power to award. 
Id. (internally quoting the district court’s opinion, 597 F. Supp. 740, 747 (E.D.N.Y 
1984)). 
110 See supra text accompanying note 16. 
111 See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 747 (E.D.N.Y. 
1984) aff’d, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that the settlement “gives the class 
more than it would likely achieve by attempting to litigate to the death”).  The district 
court also commented on its inability to heal all the plaintiffs’ pain: 
The court has been deeply moved by its contact with members of the plain-
tiffs’ class from all over the nation and abroad.  Many do deserve better of 
their country.  Had this court the power to rectify past wrongs—actual or per-
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pense caused by protracted litigation.112  The Special Master said:  
“[Title IV] is written in such a way that if [claimants] decide to litigate, 
the likelihood of success, the likelihood of receiving a substantial 
award in court, is substantially diminished.”113  Although the Special 
Master justified the limited nature of the Fund by characterizing the 
Fund’s true purpose as a cathartic act necessary to the recovery of the 
Nation, not the victims,114 this characterization is incongruous with the 
stated purpose of the Fund.115  Additionally, it was the Special Master 
who acted as the town crier with respect to the horrors of the justice 
system that awaited potential litigants.  With this background in mind, 
it seems irresponsible to force those who eventually manifest diseases 
caused by WTC exposure to resort to litigation with little hope of re-
covering compensation for their injuries.116  Once the original Fund 
has soothed the pain of the Nation, are we to leave all other victims 
to suffer in silence? 
 
ceived—it would do so.  But no single litigation can lift all of plaintiffs’ bur-
dens.  The legislative and executive branches of government—state and fed-
eral—and the Veterans Administration, as well as our many private and quasi-
public medical and social agencies, are far more capable than this court of 
shaping the larger remedies and emotional compensation plaintiffs seek. 
Id. 
112 Edwin Chen, Bush Backs Asbestos Tort Fund, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2005, at A19 
(“President Bush . . . threw his weight behind a congressional effort to create an indus-
try-financed trust fund to compensate tens of thousands of victims of asbestos-caused 
diseases, an effort to resolve the longest-running mass tort litigation in U.S. history.”).  
Professor Rabin has similarly noted this effect of asbestos litigation: 
[C]onsider that the continuing deluge of asbestos litigation has bankrupted 
an industry . . . disrupted the judicial system far beyond any other mass tort 
episode in history, and created dramatic disparities in reparation among in-
jury victims—all with no end in sight and over a twenty-five-year period—with 
no response from Congress. 
Rabin, supra note 9, at 1831. 
113 Joan Bernott Maginnis, The 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund:  Overview and Com-
ment, at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Terrorism/VictimFund.PDF; see also Rabin, 
supra note 9, at 1838 (“Even though tort remains an option, the Fund can implicitly be 
viewed as a statement of the perceived inadequacies of the tort remedy in meeting the 
call for an immediate response to the needs of the September 11 victims.”). 
114 FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 104, at 80 (“It is not the victims that justify the 
Fund, but rather the response of the entire nation the tragedy.”). 
115 See supra Part I.A. 
116 See supra note 67 (discussing the disparity between the anticipated claims and 
available insurance money); Rabin, supra note 9, at 1859-65 (discussing the challenges 
of recovering in tort facing exposure-only victims); Kenneth G. Kubes, “United We 
Stand”:  Managing Choice-of-Law Problems in September-11-Based Toxic Torts Through Federal 
Substantive Mass-Tort Law, 77 IND. L.J. 825 (2002) (analyzing the choice of law problem 
among the potential latent injuries from 9/11). 
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In structuring a fund for latent injuries, the obvious models are 
the existing Victim Compensation Fund and the Agent Orange Set-
tlement Fund.117  Also designed by Special Master Feinberg,118 the 
Agent Orange Settlement Fund is an appropriate model of an admin-
istrative compensation scheme for latent injuries.  Drawing from the 
Agent Orange Settlement Fund and the Victim Compensation Fund, 
one might loosely sketch a fund that will meet the changing needs of 
the exposure-only victims of 9/11. 
1.  Financing, Administration, and  
Claims Processing 
Like the Victim Compensation Fund, the Latent Injury Fund 
should be funded without limitation by Congress,119  and it should not 
have a scheduled termination date.  Because the Agent Orange Fund 
was a finite program, individuals manifesting injuries after the fund 
closed were precluded from recovering from the fund and filed suit 
against the original tortfeasors.120  That litigation continues to be un-
resolved.121  The Latent Injury Fund must be inclusive of all who are 
eligible and must be structured to maximize its accessibility to eligible 
individuals. 
Other than the medical research conducted independent of the 
fund, the administration of the Latent Injury Fund should be consoli-
dated within the Department of Justice.  Like the Victim Compensa-
tion Fund, the decisions of the Latent Injury Fund should not be sub-
ject to judicial oversight and parties should be required to relinquish 
their rights to litigate prior to opting into the fund.  Without this quid 
pro quo, Congress has no incentive to implement a new fund. 
 
117 See generally In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 
1985), aff’d in part, 818 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1987). 
118 Id. at 1400. 
119 See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. 107-42, § 
404(b), 115 Stat. 230, 241 (2001) (“There are authorized to be appropriated such sums 
as may be necessary to pay the administrative and support costs for the Special Master 
in carrying out this title.”); Id. § 406(b), 115 Stat. 230, 240 (“This title constitutes 
budget authority in advance of appropriations Acts and represents the obligation of 
the Federal Government to provide for the payment of amounts for compensation un-
der this title.”). 
120 Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’d in part, vacated 
in part, 539 U.S. 111 (2003). 
121 See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 346 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2003) (vacating and 
remanding the case to the district court). 
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2.  Eligibility 
a.  Pre-Registration for the Latent Injury Fund 
The question of eligibility is the most difficult one because of the 
opportunity for fraud.  However, the risk of fraud is an inadequate 
reason to not create an assistance program.  Additionally, fraudulent 
applications to the Victim Compensation Fund were negligible.122  The 
sooner the Latent Injury Fund is implemented, the sooner work can 
begin to identify fraudulent cases.  Registration for the WTC Health 
Registry should be the first step in claiming eligibility.  This has two 
purposes:  first, maximizing registration will expand the ability of the 
medical community to collect information about the effects of expo-
sure to the 9/11 plume; second, registration has no immediate bene-
fit.  Although there will undoubtedly be forward-looking fraud, no 
benefits accrue at the time of registration and therefore there is less 
incentive to register fraudulently.  The Latent Injury Fund should rely 
on the same fraud prevention guidelines as the Victim Compensation 
Fund.123 
To avoid the Amchem problems of notice and concerns about im-
posing a requirement of action on the part of otherwise healthy, ex-
posure-only injuries,124 individuals should be permitted to opt into the 
Latent Injury Fund despite not pre-registering.  However, there 
should be an increased level of scrutiny for proof of exposure for 
those that did not pre-register for the fund via the Registry. 
b.  Eligibility for Compensation from the Latent Injury Fund 
To borrow from the eligibility requirements for the Agent Orange 
Fund, to be eligible for the Latent Injury Fund, one should be re-
quired to meet the following requirements:  (1) the claimant was ex-
posed to toxins on or near the WTC site on 9/11,125 (2) the claimant 
 
122 FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 104, at 69 (“By any measure, the Fund proved re-
markably free from fraud and other criminal activity.”). 
123 See September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 28 C.F.R. § 104.71 
(2004) (establishing oversight procedures for fraud detection, prevention, and quality 
control). 
124 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997) (“[T]hose without 
current afflictions may not have the information or foresight needed to decide, intelli-
gently, whether to stay in or opt out.”). 
125 The period of time after 9/11 in which harmful exposure may have occurred 
will be determined pursuant to the findings of the WTC Registry. 
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suffers from a long-term total disability or has died,126 and (3) the 
death or disability arose principally from causes attributable to 9/11 
exposure.127  Like the Victim Compensation Fund, the Latent Injury 
Fund should not compensate claims for emotional distress without in-
jury.  Comprehensive medical studies through the Registry will need 
to provide guidelines about what sort of injuries are likely attributable 
to the exposure.  These guidelines will require some initial flexibility 
regarding eligible injuries.  Like Agent Orange, exposure consultants 
will need an objective methodology for evaluating the exposure of 
claimants.128 
3.  Award Determination 
I will not comment on whether the much-debated features of the 
Victim Compensation Fund should be replicated in any proposed 
fund for latent injuries.  The value of these features (collateral off-sets, 
uniform awards for emotional harm, flexible awards for economic 
harm) has been much discussed in the legal community129 and public 
forums.130  Although the individually tailored awards “mirror[ed] the 
civil justice system,”131 the Special Master’s Final Report seems to advo-
cate a uniform award for all claimants.132  While the administrative 
 
126 Like the Agent Orange Fund, the Latent Fund should appropriate the Social 
Security Act’s definitions of disability and death.  See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
423(d)(1)(A) (2000) (defining disability). 
127 The third requirement for the Agent Orange Fund was that “the death or dis-
ability arose principally from causes other than trauma, accident, or self-inflicted in-
jury.”  Harvey P. Berman, The Agent Orange Veteran Payment Program, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 1990, at 49, 54 (1990).  The Latent Fund should make payments for 
death or disability caused by diseases determined to be related to 9/11 exposure by the 
studies conducted with the Registry. 
128 Id. at 54. 
129 See generally Richard P. Campbell, Implementing the 9/11 Victim Compensation 
Fund:  Two Steps Forward, One Step Back, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 409 (2002); Wendy Floering, 
The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001:  A Better Alternative to Litigation?, 22 
J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 195 (2002); Linda S. Mullenix & Kristen B. Stewart, 
The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund:  Fund Approaches to Resolving Mass Tort Liti-
gation, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 153 (2002); Rabin, supra note 9; Georgene Vairo, Remedies for 
Victims of Terrorism, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1265 (2002). 
130 Belkin, supra note 12, at 92 (discussing the role of fairness in setting awards 
from the Victim Compensation Fund); David W. Chen, Worst-Hit Firm Faults Fairness of 
Sept. 11 Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2002, at A1 (reporting on Cantor Fitzgerald’s criti-
cisms of the Fund). 
131 FEINBERG ET AL., supra note 104, at 80. 
132 Id. at 82 (“A better approach might be to provide the same amount for all eli-
gible claimants.”). 
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ease of a uniform award may trump all other considerations, it is im-
portant to remember that granting a uniform award does not track 
the civil justice system, which is an important aspect of the Fund.  Al-
though a catastrophe of this magnitude heavily burdens our litigation 
system, the parallels between the Fund and a civil suit recognize the 
benefits of the justice system.  As noted in the Final Report, a flat 
award may not be sufficient consideration to force applicants to relin-
quish those benefits.133 
CONCLUSION 
The American judicial system is ill-equipped to resolve mass toxic 
torts.  And the toxic plume released by the collapse of the World 
Trade Center created a situation as unmanageable as any casebook 
mass tort, but with a twist.  The government simultaneously excluded 
the potential 300,000 exposure-only victims from the Victim Compen-
sation Fund and precluded those same victims from ever recovering 
through the tort system. 
The limited liability provision of the ATSSSA is unconstitutional.  
Congress cannot protect the airline industry at the expense of the in-
dustry’s victims.  If Congress wishes to maintain the liability cap in Ti-
tle IV, it must provide an alternative compensation scheme to those 
injured on 9/11.  Whether the compensation scheme bears any re-
semblance to that set out here is of no consequence.  We must protect 
these victims at any cost. 
 
 
133 See id. at 83 (arguing that the “flat award” approach “has much to recommend 
it”). 
